The preface, the lottery, and the logic of belief
Authors: Bovens L.1; Hawthorne J.
Source: Mind, Volume 108, Number 430, April 1999 , pp. 241-264(24)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
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Abstract:
John Locke proposed a straightforward relationship between qualitative and quantitative doxastic notions: belief corresponds to a sufficiently high degree of confidence. Richard Foley has further developed this Lockean thesis and applied it to an analysis of the preface and lottery paradoxes. Following Foley's lead, we exploit various versions of these paradoxes to chart a precise relationship between belief and probabilistic degrees of confidence. The resolutions of these paradoxes emphasize distinct but complementary features of coherent belief. These features suggest principles that tie together qualitative and quantitative doxastic notions. We show how these principles may be employed to construct a quantitative model - in terms of degrees of confidence - of an agent's qualitative doxastic state. This analysis fleshes out the Lockean thesis and provides the foundation for a logic of belief that is responsive to the logic of degrees of confidence.
Language: English
Document Type: Original article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK 73019, USA bovens@spot.colorado.edu : 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309-0232, USA
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