The MIND argument and libertarianism

Authors: Finch A.¹; Warfield T.²

Source: Mind, Volume 107, Number 427, July 1998 , pp. 515-528(14)

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Abstract:

Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom.

Language: English

Document Type: Original article

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, The University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA : 1: finch.6@nd.edu 2: warfield.3@nd.edu

Publication date: 1998-07-01

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Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.