Abstract:

The doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience (MS) states that:

Necessarily, if atoms A<INF>1</INF> through An compose an object that exemplified intrinsic qualitative properties Q<INF>1</INF> through Q<INF>n</INF>, then atoms like A<INF>1</INF> through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A<INF>1</INF> through A<INF>n</INF>, compose an object that exemplifies Q<INF>1</INF> through Q<INF>n</INF>.

I show that MS entails a contradiction and so must be rejected. And my argument against MS provides the resources to show that Global Microphysical Supervenience (GMS) is false. GMS states that possible worlds qualitatively exactly alike at the microphysical level are qualitatively exactly alike at the macrophysical level.

Document Type: Research article