Against the doctrine of microphysical supervenience

Author: Merricks, T

Source: Mind, Volume 107, Number 425, January 1998 , pp. 59-71(13)

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Abstract:

The doctrine of Microphysical Supervenience (MS) states that:

Necessarily, if atoms A<INF>1</INF> through An compose an object that exemplified intrinsic qualitative properties Q<INF>1</INF> through Q<INF>n</INF>, then atoms like A<INF>1</INF> through An (in all their respective intrinsic qualitative properties), related to one another by all the same restricted atom-to-atom relations as A<INF>1</INF> through A<INF>n</INF>, compose an object that exemplifies Q<INF>1</INF> through Q<INF>n</INF>.

I show that MS entails a contradiction and so must be rejected. And my argument against MS provides the resources to show that Global Microphysical Supervenience (GMS) is false. GMS states that possible worlds qualitatively exactly alike at the microphysical level are qualitatively exactly alike at the macrophysical level.

Document Type: Research article

Publication date: 1998-01-01

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Mind has long been a leading journal in philosophy. For well over 100 years it has presented the best of cutting edge thought from epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, and philosophy of mind. Mind continues its tradition of excellence today. Mind has always enjoyed a strong reputation for the high standards established by its editors and receives around 350 submissions each year. The editor seeks advice from a large number of expert referees, including members of the network of Associate Editors and his international advisers. Mind is published quarterly.