Commentary. Reforming teachers' pay: incentive payments, collegiate ethos and UK policy

Author: N. Adnett

Source: Cambridge Journal of Economics, Volume 27, Number 1, 1 January 2003 , pp. 145-157(13)

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Abstract:

We examine the economic rationale for the expansion of incentive pay for school-teachers in England and Wales. While incentive pay usually improves performance in terms of targeted output, research also suggests that dysfunctional behaviour is likely, particularly in occupations with multiple goals such as teaching. We develop an economic analysis of the ‘threat to collegiate ethos’ argument of those opposing increased use of incentive pay. This analysis suggests that the presence of asymmetric information, externalities and teamwork effects can provide a rationale for encouraging professional motivation.

Keywords: Teachers'; pay; Incentive pay; Professional labour markets

Document Type: Original article

Publication date: 2003-01-01

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The Cambridge Journal of Economics, founded in 1977 in the traditions of Marx, Keynes, Kalecki, Joan Robinson and Kaldor, provides a forum for theoretical, applied, policy and methodological research into social and economic issues.