Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia

Author: Slinko, Irina

Source: American Law and Economics Review, Volume 7, Number 1, 2005 , pp. 284-318(35)

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Abstract:

How does regulatory capture affect growth? We construct measures of the political power of firms and regional regulatory capture using microlevel data on the preferential treatment of firms through regional laws and regulations in Russia during the period 1992-2000. Using these measures, we find that: (1) politically powerful firms perform better on average; (2) a high level of regulatory capture hurts the performance of firms that have no political connections and boosts the performance of politically connected firms; (3) capture adversely affects small-business growth and the tax capacity of the state; and (4) there is no evidence that capture affects aggregate growth.

“oligarchy ... throws a close network of dependence relationships over all the economic and political institutions of present-day bourgeois society without exception... .”

—Vladimir Lenin, “Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism” (1916)

Keywords: Tumour necrosis factor; Rheumatoid arthritis; Etanercept; Single-nucleotide polymorphism

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahi010

Publication date: 2005-01-01

More about this publication?

The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.