Protecting Homemakers' Marriage-Specific Investments under No-Fault Divorce: A Model for Restructuring Alimony in Civil Law Countries

Author: Tsaoussis, Aspasia

Source: American Law and Economics Review, Volume 6, Number 1, 2004 , pp. 217-247(31)

Publisher: Oxford University Press

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Abstract:

The radical reform of Greek family law in 1983 included the introduction of no-fault divorce. This study examines the impact of the new liberalized divorce law on the well-being of homemakers in long-duration traditional marriages. We reviewed a sample of reported judicial decisions on postdivorce maintenance and found that Greek judges render restrictive interpretations of the general standards of need, adequacy, and sufficiency. We conclude that judges have failed to compensate full-time homemakers for their nonpecuniary contributions, and we propose a reliance-based alimony model that judges can use to protect financially weaker spouses upon divorce.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/aler/ahh005

Publication date: 2004-01-01

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  • The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.
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