Games, information, and evidence production: with application to English legal history
Author: Sanchirico, C.
Source: American Law and Economics Review, Volume 2, Number 2, 2000 , pp. 342-380(39)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Abstract:This paper studies the problem of how the legal system regulates activity outside the courtroom based on information supplied in court by interested and potentially dishonest parties. The supply of information is analyzed along a game-theoretic dimension: the extent to which the supplier has an interest in how the information will be used. Such analysis uncovers a basic trade-off in system design between the 'fixed costs' of hearings (e.g., the productive activity forsaken by participation) and the cost of the evidence produced therein. This trade-off helps to explain and connect several trends in the historical evolution of English civil process.
Document Type: Original Article
Affiliations: University of Virginia School of Law, 580 Massie Road, Charlottesville, VA 22903-1789, USA Fax: 804 924 7536
Publication date: 2000
- The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.