1. The Case for Massively Modular Models of Mind

Author: Carruthers, Peter

Source: The Architecture of the Mind, September 2006 , pp. 1-65(65)

Publisher: Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs

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Abstract:

This chapter lays out the main arguments supporting massive modularity and explicates the notion of ‘module’ that those arguments support (which is significantly weaker than on Fodor’s influential account). It argues that modularity is a property of biological systems quite generally, and of animal minds in particular. It also defends the viability of evolutionary psychology as a scientific research program. The chapter criticizes Fodor’s argument that encapsulated forms of modularity are a requirement of computational tractability, arguing that the latter can be assured through the use of various kinds of cognitive heuristic.

Keywords: biological modularity; animal minds; computational tractability; Fodor; cognitive heuristic; module; evolutionary psychology; encapsulation

Document Type: Research article