5. Content Externalism, Skepticism, and the Recognitional Conception of Self-Knowledge

Author: Bar-On, Dorit

Source: Speaking My Mind, November 2004 , pp. 147-188(42)

Publisher: Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs

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Abstract:

This chapter examines a much-discussed puzzle about how the security of avowals (specifically, the security of avowals that specify one’s mental contents) can be reconciled with so-called ’externalism’ about content. It has been argued that if externalism is true, then we face a form of scepticism about content, analogous to scepticism about the external world. However, the author argues that this reasoning relies on a ’recognitional conception’ of knowledge of content, which ought to be rejected. She further suggests that self-ascriptions of mental content are protected from sceptical arguments precisely because they do not involve or require a separate recognition of those contents.

Keywords: self-knowledge; scepticism; recognition; externalism about content

Document Type: Research article

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