12. Epistemology and Truth

Author: Davidson, Donald

Source: Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, September 2001 , pp. 177-193(17)

Publisher: Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs

Key:

- Free Content

- New Content

- Subscribed Content

- Free Trial Content

Abstract:

As the title of the paper suggests, chapter 12 discusses the relation between epistemology and truth. Davidson criticizes two main (and apparently opposing) positions according to which truth is, respectively, radically non-epistemic or to be spelled out in modal epistemological terms. Instead, Davidson suggests a partial reconciliation of the two positions by arguing that truth has to be in one way or other connected to true belief.

Keywords: radically non-epistemic; epistemology; truth; modal epistemological terms; true belief

Document Type: Research article

This article is hosted on another website.

You may be required to register, activate a subscription or purchase the article before you can obtain the full text.

Proceed