10. A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge

Author: Davidson, Donald

Source: Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, September 2001 , pp. 137-159(23)

Publisher: Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs

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Abstract:

In this chapter, a set of replies to Richard Rorty's then-pragmatist criticisms, Davidson defends a coherence theory of truth that is not incompatible but in fact yields a correspondence theory. He argues that the common ground for the theories are considerations of meaning and the objective truth-conditions that state when meanings are given. Coherence, then, is supposed to be a test for both truth and the judgement that objective truth-conditions are justified, yielding what Davidson calls a ‘non-confrontational’ correspondence and a realist stance in all departments involved.

Keywords: correspondence; Richard Rorty; knowledge; objective truth-conditions; realism; coherence; ‘non-confrontational’ correspondence; meaning; truth; pragmatism

Document Type: Research article

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