5. Indeterminism and Antirealism

Author: Davidson, Donald

Source: Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, September 2001 , pp. 69-85(17)

Publisher: Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs

Key:

- Free Content

- New Content

- Subscribed Content

- Free Trial Content

Abstract:

Gives an insight into the richness of Davidson's contributions to the realism–anti-realism debate, here with regards to the factuality of propositional-attitude talk. Davidson argues that anti-realism is best understood in epistemological terms, as a stance that commits ontologically in the light of what can be known. He concludes that, generally, one should not have anti-realist attitudes as understood here towards propositional attitudes and, in particular, argues that one does not have to give up belief in first-person authority, even if one accepts Quine's indeterminacy thesis.

Keywords: indeterminacy thesis; realism–anti-realism debate; Quine; anti-realism; epistemology; propositional attitudes; first-person authority; ontological commitment; factuality of propositional-attitude talk

Document Type: Research article

This article is hosted on another website.

You may be required to register, activate a subscription or purchase the article before you can obtain the full text.

Proceed