3. Stalnaker on Intentionality

Author: Field, Hartry

Source: Truth and the Absence of Fact, March 2001 , pp. 83-104(22)

Publisher: Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs

Key:

- Free Content

- New Content

- Subscribed Content

- Free Trial Content

Abstract:

Argues that there are two reasons for ascribing to mental states, structures more fine-grained than the sets of possible world they represent: first, fine-grained structure enters naturally into the explanation of behaviour; second, fine-grained structure is needed in a theory of how those states represent the sets of possible worlds they represent. In connection with the first point, it is argued that Stalnaker's attempt to use metalinguistic content to obviate the need of fine-grained structure cannot work. In connection with the second point, it is argued that the systematicity in the assignment of content to mental states can be accommodated only by postulating a fine-grained structure for mental states. Also contains some discussion of doing without representational content, understood in the non-deflationary sense that Stalnaker assumes.

Keywords: belief; truth-conditions; functionalism; semantics; conceptual role; logical connectives; representation; language of thought; narrow psychology; Stalnaker

Document Type: Research article

This article is hosted on another website.

You may be required to register, activate a subscription or purchase the article before you can obtain the full text.

Proceed