6. Can Science Know When You're Conscious?

Author: Goldman, Alvin I.

Source: Pathways to Knowledge, January 2002 , pp. 114-137(24)

Publisher: Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs

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Abstract:

Consciousness researchers commonly rely on their subjects’ verbal reports to determine their conscious states. Is this defensible in the conduct of science? Attempts might be made to rationalize the reliance on verbal reports by appealing to higher-order thought or functionalist approaches to consciousness, but these are rejected. A third approach is defended, based on subjects’ introspective capacities. Admittedly, the reliability of introspection cannot be independently validated, but an independent validation requirement is too restrictive for an epistemologically “basic” method.

Keywords: verbal report; consciousness; functionalism; higher-order thought; epistemology; introspection

Document Type: Research article

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