14. The Intrinsic Quality of Experience

Author: Harman, Gilbert

Source: Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind, July 1999 , pp. 244-262(19)

Publisher: Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs

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Abstract:

Replies to three related arguments against wide functionalism. The first says that we are directly aware of intrinsic features of our experience and points out that there is no way to account for such an awareness in a purely functional view. The second claims that a person blind from birth can know all about the functional role of visual experience without knowing what it is like to see something red. The third holds that functionalism cannot account for the possibility of an inverted spectrum. All three arguments can be defused by distinguishing properties of the object of experience from properties of the experience of an object.

Keywords: subjective experience; object of experiences; intrinsic quality; functionalism; colour; inverted spectrum

Document Type: Research article

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