4. Pragmatism and Reasons for Belief

Author: Harman, Gilbert

Source: Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind, July 1999 , pp. 93-117(25)

Publisher: Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content

Abstract:

Discusses how to explain the distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic reasons while allowing epistemic reasons to be affected by pragmatic considerations of simplicity, coherence, and conservatism. After noting difficulties with trying to explain epistemic reasons in terms of connections with truth or the goal of believing what is true, the chapter discusses issues about the nature of probability, suggesting that epistemic reasons connect with conditional probability in a way that non-epistemic reasons do not.

Keywords: reasons; epistemic reasons; coherence; probability; pragmatism; conservatism; simplicity

Document Type: Research article

This article is hosted on another website.

You may be required to register, activate a subscription or purchase the article before you can obtain the full text.

Proceed

Back to top

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Page Help Click here for Page Help
Shopping cart
Tools
Sign in






Need to register?
Sign up here
Text size: A | A | A | A