10. Perception and Truth

Author: O'Shaughnessy, Brian

Source: Consciousness and the World, January 2003 , pp. 318-339(22)

Publisher: Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs

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Abstract:

Perception is here differentiated from the discovery-experience that we describe as ‘perceiving that . . .’, the claim being that perception is of things (broadly conceived) and not of propositions. Perceiving-that is shown to be a special case of perceptually acquired belief-acquisition. Whereas ‘wanted’ retains the one sense in ‘He wanted to shout’ and ‘He wanted his team to win’, ‘aware’ is ambiguous in ‘he was aware of a whistle’ and ‘he was aware that a whistle was occurring’. Perception is differentiated further from the thought-experience on the counts of object/content/constitution, and above all in its mode of agreement or disagreement with Reality. Thus, whereas thoughts are capable of truth and falsity, perceptions have no truth-value. This is confirmed through a discussion of negative experience, in which it is claimed that, unlike thoughts, perception cannot take negative objects. Perception is of ‘positivity’ all the way.

Keywords: proposition; perception; belief; truth; thought; perceiving that; concreteness

Document Type: Research article

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