@article {Bilgrami:19  October 2000::207,
	author = "Bilgrami, Akeel",
	title = "7. Self-Knowledge and Resentment",
	journal = "Knowing Our Own Minds",
	volume = "1",
	year = "19  October 2000",
	abstract = "The paper pursues the question: what makes self-knowledge of our intentional states special, what makes it different from other kinds of knowledge? It does so by contrasting a ’constitutive’ view of self-knowledge with a perceptual model of self-knowledge, and claims that if the former can be shown to be plausible, that will establish the special character of self-knowledge. It then follows Crispin Wright in setting up a biconditional, which links the first-order and second-order intentional states as a prima facie mark of the constitutive view of self-knowledge. In the rest of the paper, however, a quite different understanding of the biconditional is provided from the one in Crispin Wright's work. The biconditional is given support by a normative conception of agency owing to Strawson's conception of freedom, and a normative conception of intentionality. The overarching claim of the paper is that the special character of self-knowledge is of a piece with the special nature of the agent's or first person point of view, and at bottom, both self-knowledge and the point of view of agency are of a piece with the irreducibility of norms and values to states of nature, as natural sciences study them.",
	pages = "207-243(37)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oso/17388/2000/00000001/00000001/art00008"
}