3. The Rationality Theory

Author: Goldman, Alvin I.

Source: Simulating Minds, August 2006 , pp. 53-69(17)

Publisher: Oxford Scholarship Online Monographs

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Abstract:

Daniel Dennett’s “intentional stance” theory is a leading specimen of the rationality theory, though Dennett vacillates in offering stronger and weaker variants. In the strong formulations, the theory is quite implausible; in its weak formulations, its content is too thin to have predictive implications. It also suffers from an inability to handle attributions over the entire range of mental states, including sensations like thirst, hunger, or itchiness. Finally, it offers no satisfactory story of how mental concepts are understood. An ostensibly related theory, the “teleological stance” theory, doesn’t really claim to explain mental state attribution.

Keywords: intentional stance; Dennett; sensations; mental concepts; teleological stance

Document Type: Research article

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