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Game-Theoretic Models for Jamming Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Devices

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Radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (RCIEDs) have been a major weapon of choice by Iraqi insurgents since 2003. One effective way to prevent an RCIED attack is to use electronic jamming devices to interfere with the communication between the trigger and the bomb itself. Due to power constraints and other considerations, however, a jammer usually cannot jam all triggers simultaneously. In this paper, we develop game-theoretic models to study both active jamming and reactive jamming. For active jamming, we compute the optimal mixed strategy by linear programming; for reactive jamming, we use an iterative method. Finally, we numerically demonstrate our models and their applications.

Document Type: Research Article


Publication date: September 1, 2011

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