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The Kreps–Scheinkman Game in Mixed Duopolies

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We extend the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved. We also investigate the case of public Stackelberg leadership and that of private Stackelberg leadership. (JEL: D43, H44, L13, L32)
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Keywords: Bertrand-Edgeworth; Cournot; Stackelberg leadership; state-owned firm

Appeared or available online: Thu Mar 09 15:30:00 UTC 2017

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