Simultaneous Pooled Auctions with Multiple Bids and Preference Lists

Authors: Janssen, Maarten C.W.; Karamychev, Vladimir A.; Maasland, Emiel

Source: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Volume 166, Number 2, June 2010 , pp. 286-298(13)

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $33.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

A simultaneous pooled auction with multiple bids and preference lists is a way to auction multiple heterogeneous objects to multiple bidders with unit demand. Bidders submit bids for every object, and a preference ordering over which object they would like to get if they have the highest bid on more than one object. This type of auction has been used in the Netherlands and in Ireland to auction available spectrum. We show that this type of auction does not satisfy elementary desirable properties such as the existence of an efficient equilibrium.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245610791343049

Publication date: 2010-06-01

More about this publication?

Founded as Zeitschrift f�r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1844.

As one of the oldest journals in the field of political economy, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) deals traditionally with the problems of economics, social policy, and their legal framework. JITE is listed in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Social Science Citation Index, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and COREJ.
Editorial Board
Information for Authors
Subscribe to this Title
Information for Advertisers
Terms & Conditions
Beitrage zur Finanzwissenschaft
Neue okonomische Grundrisse
Conferences on New Political Economy
ingentaconnect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites