Norm Enforcement: The Role of Third Parties

Authors: Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans

Source: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Volume 166, Number 2, June 2010 , pp. 239-258(20)

Buy & download fulltext article:

Price: $33.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

To be effective, norm enforcement often requires the participation of unaffected third parties. The logic of third-party intervention has, however, proven elusive because the costs always seem to outweigh the benefits. Using an evolutionary game theoretic approach, we posit that the intervention of unaffected bystanders is a triggered normative response and show that generalized punishment norms survive in one of the two stable equilibria subject to selection drift.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245610791343003

Publication date: 2010-06-01

More about this publication?

Founded as Zeitschrift f�r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1844.

As one of the oldest journals in the field of political economy, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) deals traditionally with the problems of economics, social policy, and their legal framework. JITE is listed in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Social Science Citation Index, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and COREJ.
Editorial Board
Information for Authors
Subscribe to this Title
Information for Advertisers
Terms & Conditions
Beitrage zur Finanzwissenschaft
Neue okonomische Grundrisse
Conferences on New Political Economy
ingentaconnect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites