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Effectuating Public International Law through Market Mechanisms?

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Abstract:

Traditionally, the enforcement of public international law (PIL) was a task of states: its addressees and its enforcers were states. That has changed recently. Whereas the influence of private market actors on the making of PIL has been extensively analyzed, their influence on its enforcement has been neglected, although the idea of using private interests in order to foster social goals has a long history. This article draws on theoretical insights of a rational-choice approach to PIL in order to analyze the prerequisites of effectuating PIL through private-market-actor incentives and market mechanisms.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245609787369769

Publication date: March 1, 2009

More about this publication?
  • Founded as Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1844.

    As one of the oldest journals in the field of political economy, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) deals traditionally with the problems of economics, social policy, and their legal framework. JITE is listed in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Social Science Citation Index, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and COREJ.

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    From 2013 on all accepted articles are published in an Online First version (in their final layout) to make them searchable and citable by their DOI immediately after peer review and acceptance. Once the article is published in an issue of the journal, the Online First version will be removed.

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