Boycotts, Power Politics, or Trust Building: How to Prevent Conflict?

Authors: Schollaert, Arne; Van de Gaer, Dirk

Source: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Volume 164, Number 2, June 2008 , pp. 356-379(24)

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Abstract:

In a game of imperfect information, the paper analyses whether different types of intervention by third parties can ensure that political (ethnic, religious, social, etc.) groups within a country will pursue a cooperative strategy and how easy it is to predict their effects. We conclude that a strong boycott is the only instrument that is always effective and that trust building, although currently widely acclaimed by, e.g., the United Nations, is not only less effective but difficult to predict and - like power politics - can favour one group at the expense of the other. (JEL: C 72, D 74)

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245608784514491

Publication date: 2008-06-01

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Founded as Zeitschrift f�r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1844.

As one of the oldest journals in the field of political economy, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) deals traditionally with the problems of economics, social policy, and their legal framework. JITE is listed in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Social Science Citation Index, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and COREJ.
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