Time-Inconsistent Domestic Environmental Policies and Optimal International Environmental Arrangements

Authors: Chongvilaivan, Aekapol; Hur, Jung

Source: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Volume 163, Number 4, December 2007 , pp. 731-758(28)

Publisher: Mohr Siebeck

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Abstract:

We employ the standard pollution control incorporating countries' asymmetries, not only in their consumption and environmental concerns, but also in their environmental technologies. First, we show that the absence of international collaboration makes domestic environmental policies discretionary and may result in a time-inconsistent outcome. Then, we compare two cooperative regimes: the international environmental agreement (IEA) and the central environmental authority (CEA). In certain conditions, IEAs may not be more efficient than CEAs in pollution abatement. Furthermore, although the IEA Pareto-dominates the CEA, the success of IEAs may be hampered by conflicts of interest among the signatories.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/093245607783242963

Publication date: 2007-12-01

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Founded as Zeitschrift f�r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1844.

As one of the oldest journals in the field of political economy, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) deals traditionally with the problems of economics, social policy, and their legal framework. JITE is listed in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Social Science Citation Index, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and COREJ.
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