Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China

Authors: Loren Brandt; Scott Rozelle; Matthew A. Turner

Source: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Volume 160, Number 4, December 2004 , pp. 627-662(36)

Publisher: Mohr Siebeck

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Abstract:

Secure land tenure is important to the development process, but China's rural reforms have so far failed to provide farm households with this security. We examine the political economy of land tenure and find that local governments sacrifice tenure security in the interests of efficiency and equity. Local rent seeking also plays an important role, and is a likely source of the under-development of land rental markets. Our results further suggest that decreases in distortionary taxes and increases in the integrity of elections will lead to more secure tenure and an increased reliance on market land exchange.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/0932456042776032

Publication date: 2004-12-01

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Founded as Zeitschrift f�r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1844.

As one of the oldest journals in the field of political economy, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) deals traditionally with the problems of economics, social policy, and their legal framework. JITE is listed in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Social Science Citation Index, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and COREJ.
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