An Information-Saving and Efficient Nuisance Rule

Author: Iljoong Kim

Source: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Volume 158, Number 3, September 2002 , pp. 514-527(14)

Publisher: Mohr Siebeck

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Abstract:

The existing literature postulates that in nuisance suits courts should balance, for a property right under conflict, several values of the litigating parties. This practice, however, is controversial, mainly due to courts' resource scarcity. This paper suggests an alternative institutional mechanism with which to relieve courts of various disputes and the potential demoralization arising from the judicial comparison of subjective values. It further submits that Posner's nuisance rule can be fully utilized under imperfect information.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/0932456022975321

Publication date: 2002-09-01

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Founded as Zeitschrift f�r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1844.

As one of the oldest journals in the field of political economy, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) deals traditionally with the problems of economics, social policy, and their legal framework. JITE is listed in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Social Science Citation Index, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and COREJ.
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