Indentured Migration in America's Great Basin: An Observation in Strategic Behavior in Cooperative Exchanges

Author: Scott Alan Carson

Source: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE, Volume 157, Number 4, December 2001 , pp. 651-676(26)

Publisher: Mohr Siebeck

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Abstract:

The Perpetual Emigrating Fund was a 19th century form of indentured migration that assisted European immigrants to America's Great Basin. Immigrants signed future contracts against their Great Basin labor to repay migration loans. The Fund encountered high monitoring costs to enforce contracts in rural areas. In the absence of a strong legal system, the Fund developed a series of enforcement mechanisms that relied on social norms and morays. Hence, the Perpetual Emigrating Fund demonstrates the success and failures of an institution that attempted to remain solvent with imperfect contracts and enforcement mechanisms.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/0932456012974440

Publication date: 2001-12-01

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Founded as Zeitschrift f�r die gesamte Staatswissenschaft in 1844.

As one of the oldest journals in the field of political economy, the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) deals traditionally with the problems of economics, social policy, and their legal framework. JITE is listed in the Journal of Economic Literature, the Social Science Citation Index, the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, and COREJ.
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