Monitoring and Productive Efficiency in Public and Private Firms

Authors: Kessler, Anke S.; Lülfesmann, Christoph

Source: FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Volume 58, Number 2, February 2002 , pp. 167-187(21)

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Abstract:

The paper compares productive efficiency in public and private firms. We study a principal-agent model in which the firm's manager is privately informed about a cost parameter and exerts unobservable cost reducing effort, while the owner can conduct costly audits to obtain information about the firm's cost. Without auditing, managerial effort (and therefore production efficiency) is strictly higher under public governance with a benevolent government. However, if auditing is possible, a profit-maximizing private owner always audits at least as frequently as a public principal. For small auditing costs, we find that monitoring decisions, managerial effort and welfare under both governance structures coincide. Conversely, when audits becomes more expensive, the public (but not the private) owner refrains from monitoring, and the private firm may produce more cost efficiently.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1628/0015221022905713

Publication date: 2002-02-01

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FinanzArchiv founded in 1884 is one of the world's oldest professional journals in public finance.

FinanzArchiv publishes original work from all fields of public economics which are of interest to an international readership, e.g. taxation, public debt, public goods, public choice, federalism, market failure, social policy, and the welfare state. Special emphasis is on high-quality theoretical and empirical papers on current policy issues.

FinanzArchiv is a well-established, internationally oriented journal in the field of public economics, widely read in Europe and all over the world.

FinanzArchiv is listed in the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI, JCR impact factor 2007 0,296), in Current Contents/Social and Behavioral Sciences, in IDEAS and RePEc (IDEAS/RePEc simple impact factor 2008 1.177), in the Journal of Economic Literature (CD and online), and in the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences.

FinanzArchiv is a fully peer-reviewed journal committed to a prompt turnaround of submissions. No more than four months should pass between online submission of a manuscript and the editor's decision on acceptance, revision, or rejection.
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Monitoring and Productive Efficiency in Public and Private Firms

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