The “New palace guards:” Elections and Elites in Morocco and Jordan
Abstract:In 2007, parliamentary elections in Jordan and Morocco marked the emergence of business-minded elites and technocrats who attempted to enact reform from within parliament but remained loyal to the regime. Using Albert Hirschman's framework of “exit, voice and loyalty,” this article argues that the decisions of these “new elites” are in part a function of electoral systems. In particular, personalistic electoral systems encourage political actors to play by the rules and produce “loyalty” outcomes because they ensure patronage benefits. This incentive structure provides some insights into the logic of electoral reform and the relative stability of these two monarchies in contrast to the defection of elites during parliamentary elections in Egypt and the Palestinian Territories around the same time.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: June 1, 2012
The Middle East Institute has published The Middle East Journal quarterly since 1947. The Journal provides original and objective research and analysis, as well as source material, on the area from Morocco to Pakistan and including Central Asia. The Journal provides the background necessary for an understanding and appreciation of the region's political and economic development, cultural heritage, ethnic and religious diversity.
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