Stumbling Decidedly into the Six-Day War
Abstract:In the historiography of the 1967 War, the common reading is to portray it as an "inadvertent war." Using recently declassified documents, this article offers an alternative interpretation. In critically examining existing master plan theories, it is shown that the United Arab Republic's (UAR) military actions were limited in size and were without aggressive intentions. The Israeli decision to strike was taken not for military reasons but rather to prevent a diplomatic solution which might have entailed disadvantages for the Israeli side.
Document Type: Research Article
Publication date: April 1, 2006
The Middle East Institute has published The Middle East Journal quarterly since 1947. The Journal provides original and objective research and analysis, as well as source material, on the area from Morocco to Pakistan and including Central Asia. The Journal provides the background necessary for an understanding and appreciation of the region's political and economic development, cultural heritage, ethnic and religious diversity.
- Information for Authors
- Submit a Paper
- Subscribe to this Title
- Membership Information
- Information for Advertisers
- Publishers - Books for Review
- Editors Blog
- ingentaconnect is not responsible for the content or availability of external websites