Author: Kulvicki, John

Source: Synthese, Volume 156, Number 2, May 2007 , pp. 205-229(25)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

The central claim of this paper is that what it is like to see green or any other perceptible property is just the perceptual mode of presentation of that property. Perceptual modes of presentation are important because they help resolve a tension in current work on consciousness. Philosophers are pulled by three mutually inconsistent theses: representational externalism, representationalism, and phenomenal internalism. I throw my hat in with defenders of the first two: the externalist representationalists. We are faced with the problem of explaining away intuitions that favor phenomenal internalism. Perceptual modes of presentation account for what it is like to see properties in a way that accommodates those intuitions without vindicating phenomenal internalism itself. Perceptual MoPs therefore provide a new way of being an externalist representationalist.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-0003-3

Affiliations: 1: Email: Kulvicki@Dartmouth.edu

Publication date: 2007-05-01

Related content

• In this: publication
• By this: publisher
• In this Subject: Philosophy
• By this author: Kulvicki, John

Website © Publishing Technology. Article copyright remains with the publisher, society or author(s) as specified within the article.

• Terms and conditions
• Privacy policy
• Information for advertisers