The duality principle: irreducibility of sub-threshold psychophysical computation to neuronal brain activation
Author: Bentwich, Jonathan1
Source: Synthese, Volume 153, Number 3, December 2006 , pp. 451-455(5)
Publisher: Springer
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Abstract:
A key working hypothesis in neuroscience is `materialistic reductionism', i.e., the assumption whereby all physiological, behavioral or cognitive phenomena is produced by localized neurochemical brain activation (but not vice versa). However, analysis of sub-threshold Weber's psychophysical stimulation indicates its computational irreducibility to the direct interaction between psychophysical stimulation and any neuron/s. This is because the materialistic-reductionistic working hypothesis assumes that the determination of the existence or non-existence of any psychophysical stimulation [s] may only be determined through its direct interaction [di1] with a given neuron/s [N] that together forms the `neural registry' computational level [NR/di1]. But, this implies that in cases of (initial) sub-threshold (sensory-specific) psychophysical stimulation which is increased above the sensory-specific threshold but below Weber's psychophysical `dv'—the psychophysical computational processing [PCP] produces an apparently `computationally indeterminate' output. This is because materialistic reductionism asserts the contingency of PCP upon the existence of a direct interaction between `s' and `N' within the NR/di1 level, but in the special case of Weber's sub-threshold psychophysical stimulation the same PCP/di1 also asserts the non-existence of `s' (as demanded by Weber's psychophysical law). However, given robust empirical evidence indicating the capability of PCP to determine whether (or not) `s' exists, we must conclude that PCP may not be carried out from within NR's direct interaction between a particular psychophysical stimulation and any set of neuron/s in the brain. Hence, the Duality Principle asserts the conceptual irreducibility of sub-threshold psychophysical stimulation to any direct NR/di1: s-N interaction, thereby challenging the current materialistic-reductionistic assumption.Keywords: Neuroscience; Computation; Materialistic reductionism; Duality principle; Psychophysics; Body-mind; Binding problem
Document Type: Research article
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9101-5
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