Counterfactuals and Epistemic Probability

Author: Otte, R.

Source: Synthese, Volume 152, Number 1, September 2006 , pp. 81-93(13)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga's intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen's and Plantinga's intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-1332-3

Affiliations: 1: Email: otte@ucsc.edu

Publication date: 2006-09-01