@article {Marcus:May 2006:0039-7857:99,
	author = "Marcus, Eric",
	title = "Events, Sortals, and the MindBody Problem",
	journal = "Synthese",
	volume = "150",
	year = "May 2006",
	abstract = "In recent decades, a view of identity I call Sortalism has gained popularity. According to this view, if a is identical to b, then there is some sortal S such that a is the same S as b. Sortalism has typically been discussed with respect to the identity of objects. I argue that the motivations for Sortalism about objectidentity apply equally well to event-identity. But Sortalism about event-identity poses a serious threat to the view that mental events are token identical to physical events: A particular mental event m is identical with a particular physical event p only if there is a sortal S such that m and p are both Ss. If there is no such sortal, the doctrine of token-identity is not true. I argue here that we have no good reason for thinking that there is any such sortal.",
	pages = "99-129(31)",
	url = "http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/synt/2006/00000150/00000001/00006258"
	doi = "doi:10.1007/s11229-004-6258-7"
}