Mind, Brain, and Epistemologically Different Worlds

Author: Vacariu, Gabriel

Source: Synthese, Volume 147, Number 3, December 2005 , pp. 515-548(34)

Publisher: Springer

Buy & download fulltext article:

OR

Price: $47.00 plus tax (Refund Policy)

Abstract:

The reason why, since Descartes, nobody has found a solution to the mind–body problem seems to be that the problem itself is a false or pseudo-problem. The discussion has proceeded within a pre-Cartesian conceptual framework which itself is a source of the difficulty. Dualism and all its alternatives have preserved the same pre-Cartesian conceptual framework even while denying Descartes' dualism. In order to avoid this pseudo-problem, I introduce a new perspective with three elements: the subject, the observed object, and the conditions of observation (given by the internal and external tools of observation). On this new perspective, because of the conditions of observation, the mind and the brain belong to epistemologically different worlds.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-8366-4

Affiliations: 1: Email: gvacariu@yahoo.com

Publication date: 2005-12-01

Related content

Key

Free Content
Free content
New Content
New content
Open Access Content
Open access content
Subscribed Content
Subscribed content
Free Trial Content
Free trial content

Text size:

A | A | A | A
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages. print icon Print this page