Truly Justified Belief

Author: Vision, G.

Source: Synthese, Volume 146, Number 3, September 2005 , pp. 405-446(42)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

I defend the view that justified belief is preferable to plain belief only because the former enhances the likelihood that the belief is true: call that sort of justification truth-linked. A collection of philosophical theories either state outright that this is not so, imply it via other doctrines, or adopt a notion of truth that renders the link innocuous. The discussion proceeds as follows. Issues and various positions are outlined, and needed qualifications are entered (parts I-III). We then note general shortcomings of all views rejecting the truth-link, and critically examine a powerful thought experiment underlying the rejection (part IV). In the final sections we explore two other challenges to the truth-link. First (part V), we consider forms of idealized justification theory that would imply the independence of justification from the relevant sort of truth conduciveness; next (part VI) we investigate a view, Pragmatism, which maintains that epistemic justification is sanctioned by ends other than a tendency towards truth.

Document Type: Research Article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-6228-0

Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, Temple University, Anderson Hall, 7th Floor 12th and Berks Mall, Philadelphia, PA, 19122, U.S.A,

Publication date: September 1, 2005

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