Indexical Propositions and De Re Belief Ascriptions
Author: Balaguer, Mark
Source: Synthese, Volume 146, Number 3, September 2005 , pp. 325-355(31)
Abstract:I develop here a novel version of the Fregean view of belief ascriptions (i.e., sentences of the form ‘S believes that p’) and I explain how my view accounts for various problem cases that many philosophers have supposed are incompatible with Fregeanism. The so-called problem cases involve (a) what Perry calls essential indexicals and (b) De Re ascriptions in which it is acceptable to substitute coreferential but non-synonymous terms in belief contexts. I also respond to two traditional worries about what the sense of a proper name could be, and I explain how my view provides intuitively pleasing solutions to Kripke’s ‘London’–‘Londres’ puzzle and his Paderewski puzzle. Finally, in addition to defending my view, I also argue very briefly against Russellian alternatives to Fregeanism.
Document Type: Research Article
Affiliations: Department of Philosophy, California State University, Los Angeles, 5151 State University Drive, Los Angeles, CA, 90032–8114, U.S.A, Email: email@example.com
Publication date: 2005-09-01