Reason and the Past: The Role of Rationality in Diachronic Self-Knowledge

Author: Lawlor, Krista1

Source: Synthese, Volume 145, Number 3, July 2005 , pp. 467-495(29)

Publisher: Springer

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content

Abstract:

Knowing one’s past thoughts and attitudes is a vital sort of self-knowledge. In the absence of memorial impressions to serve as evidence, we face a pressing question of how such self-knowledge is possible. Recently, philosophers of mind have argued that self-knowledge of past attitudes supervenes on rationality. I examine two kinds of argument for this supervenience claim, one from cognitive dynamics, and one from practical rationality, and reject both. I present an alternative account, on which knowledge of past attitudes is inferential knowledge, and depends upon contingent facts of one’s rationality and consistency. Failures of self-knowledge are better explained by the inferential account.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-005-6220-3

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Stanford University Building, 90, Room 91-C, Stanford, CA, 94305-2155, U.S.A., Email: klawlor@stanford.edu

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$47.00 plus tax      Refund Policy

 

OR

Back to top

Key:
Free Content - Free Content
New Content - New Content
Subscribed Content - Subscribed Content
Free Trial Content - Free Trial Content
Share this item with others: These icons link to social bookmarking sites where readers can share and discover new web pages.
Page Help Click here for Page Help
Shopping cart
Tools
Sign in






Need to register?
Sign up here
Text size: A | A | A | A