Alethic Functionalism and Our Folk Theory of Truth

Author: Lynch, M.

Source: Synthese, Volume 145, Number 1, May 2005 , pp. 29-43(15)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the view’s main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes “true” as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-1771-2

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, 101 Manchester Hall, 344 Mansfield Road, Storrs, CT, 06269-2054, U.S.A, Email: mplynch@uconn.edu

Publication date: 2005-05-01