Intentionalism and Intransitivity
Author: Deutsch, Max
Source: Synthese, Volume 144, Number 1, March 2005 , pp. 1-22(22)
Publisher: Springer
Abstract:
I argue in this paper that the existence of sorites series of color patches series of color patches arranged so that the patches on each end look different in color though no two adjacent patches do shows that the relation of same phenomenal character as is not a transitive relation. I then argue that the intransitivity of same phenomenal character as conflicts with certain versions of intentionalism, the view that an experiences phenomenal character is exhausted, or fully determined by its intentional content. Lastly, I consider various objections to the arguments and reply to them.Document Type: Research article
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-1022-1
Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, The University of Hong Kong, Room 301 Main Building Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong, China, Email: maxdeutsch@hkusua.hku.hk
Publication date: 2005-03-01
- In this: publication
- By this: publisher
- In this Subject: Philosophy
- By this author: Deutsch, Max

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