Minimalism, the Generalization Problem and the Liar

Author: Armour-Garb B.¹

Source: Synthese, Volume 139, Number 3, April 2004 , pp. 491-512(22)

Publisher: Springer

Key:

- Free Content

- New Content

- Subscribed Content

- Free Trial Content

Abstract:

In defense of the minimalist conception of truth, Paul Horwich (2001) has recently argued that our acceptance of the instances of the schema, `the proposition that p is true if and only if p', suffices to explain our acceptance of truth generalizations, that is, of general claims formulated using the truth predicate. In this paper, I consider the strategy Horwich develops for explaining our acceptance of truth generalizations. As I show, while perhaps workable on its own, the strategy is in conflict with his response to the liar paradox. Something must give. I consider and reject various alternatives and emendations to the strategy. In order to resolve the conflict, I propose an alternative approach to the liar, one that supports Horwich's strategy while leaving minimalism maximally uncompromised.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: 10.1023/B:SYNT.0000024891.87160.c3

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy University at Albany SUNY 1400 Washington Avenue Albany, NY 12222 U.S.A., Email: armourgarb@albany.edu

The full text electronic article is available for purchase. You will be able to download the full text electronic article after payment.

$47.00 plus tax Refund Policy