To Structure, or not to Structure?

Author: Robbins P.

Source: Synthese, Volume 139, Number 1, March 2004 , pp. 55-80(26)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

Some accounts of mental content represent the objects of belief as structured, using entities that formally resemble the sentences used to express and report attitudes in natural language; others adopt a relatively unstructured approach, typically using sets or functions. Currently popular variants of the latter include classical and neoclassical propositionalism, which represent belief contents as sets of possible worlds and sets of centered possible worlds, respectively; and property self-ascriptionism, which employs sets of possible individuals. I argue against their contemporary proponents that all three views are ineluctably plagued by generation gaps: they either overgenerate beliefs, undergenerate them, or both.

Document Type: Research article

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:SYNT.0000021308.22619.83

Affiliations: 1: Washington University in St. Louis Department of Philosophy Campus Box 1073 1 Brookings Drive St. Louis, MO 63130-4899 U.S.A.

Publication date: 2004-03-01