Consciousness, Higher-Order Content, and the Individuation of Vehicles

Author: Kriegel U.

Source: Synthese, Volume 134, Number 3, March 2003 , pp. 477-504(28)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

One of the distinctive properties of conscious states is the peculiar self-awareness implicit in them. Two rival accounts of this self-awareness are discussed. According to a Neo-Brentanian account, a mental state M is conscious iff M represents its very own occurrence. According to the Higher-Order Monitoring account, M is merely accompanied by a numerically distinct representation of its occurrence. According to both, then, M is conscious in virtue of figuring in a higher-order content. The disagreement is over the question whether the higher-order content is carried by M itself or by a different state. While the Neo-Brentanian theory is phenomenologically more attractive, it is often felt to be somewhat mysterious. It is argued (i) that the difference between the Neo-Brentanian and Higher-Order Monitoring theories is smaller and more empirical than may initially seem, and (ii) that the Neo-Brentanian theory can be readily demystified. These considerations make it prima faciepreferable to the Higher-Order Monitoring theory.

Language: English

Document Type: Research article

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy Brown University Box 1918 Providence, RI 02912, USA E-mail: theuriah@yahoo.com

Publication date: 2003-03-01