Necessity, The A Priori, And The Standard Meter

Author: Loomis E.

Source: Synthese, Volume 121, Number 3, December 1999 , pp. 291-307(17)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

This article critically examines Saul Kripke's (1972) argument for the separability of necessary truths from truths known a priori, focusing on his criticism of the standard meter case presented by Wittgenstein (1968). It attempts to show that Kripke's argument is unworkable on any of several readings. Wittgenstein's own broadly conventionalist account of necessary truth is then considered in the light of the standard meter example.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy University of Texas at Austin Austin, TX 78712-1180 U.S.A. E-mail: ejloomis@mail.utexas.edu

Publication date: 1999-12-01

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