Logical Truth and Tarskian Logical Truth

Author: Gómez-torrente M.

Source: Synthese, Volume 117, Number 3, 1998 , pp. 375-408(34)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

This paper examines the question of the extensional correctness of Tarskian definitions of logical truth and logical consequence. I identify a few different informal properties which are necessary for a sentence to be an informal logical truth and look at whether they are necessary properties of Tarskian logical truths. I examine arguments by John Etchemendy and Vann McGee to the effect that some of those properties are not necessary properties of some Tarskian logical truths, and find them unconvincing. I stress the point that since the hypothesis that Tarski's definitions are extensionally correct is deeply entrenched, the burden of proof is still on the shoulders of Tarski's critics, who have not lifted the burden.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas Universidad Nacional Autó}noma de México México D.F. 04510, Mexico E-mail: mariogt@servidor.unam.mx

Publication date: 1998-01-01

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