Freedom, Causation, and the Consequence Argument

Author: Ekstrom L.W.

Source: Synthese, Volume 115, Number 3, 1998 , pp. 333-354(22)

Publisher: Springer

Abstract:

The problem of analyzing causation and the problem of incompatibilism versus compatibilism are largely distinct. Yet, this paper will show that there are some theories of causation that a compatibilist should not endorse: namely, counterfactual theories, specifically the one developed by David Lewis and a newer, amended version of his account. Endorsing either of those accounts of causation undercuts the main compatibilist reply to a powerful argument for incompatibilism. Conversely, the argument of this paper has the following message for incompatibilists: you have reason to consider defending a counterfactual theory of causation.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy, Bates College, Lewiston, ME 04240, USA

Publication date: 1998-01-01

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