RECIPROCAL JUSTIFICATION IN SCIENCE AND MORAL THEORY

Author: BLACHOWICZ J.

Source: Synthese, Volume 110, Number 3, March 1997 , pp. 447-468(22)

Publisher: Springer

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Abstract:

In this paper, I analyze the particular conception of reciprocal justification proposed by Nelson Goodman and incorporated by John Rawls into what he called ``reflective equilibrium''. I propose a way of avoiding the twin dangers which threaten to push this idea to either of two extremes: the reliance on epistemically privileged observation reports (or moral judgments in Rawls' version), which tends to disrupt the balance struck between the two sides of the equilibrium and to re-establish a foundationalism; and the denial of any privileged status to such reports (or judgments), which makes the equilibrium into a theoretical monolith.

Language: English

Document Type: Regular paper

Affiliations: 1: Department of Philosophy Loyola University of Chicago 6525 North Sheridan Rd. Chicago IL 606026

Publication date: 1997-03-01